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LEVEL-AGREEMENT VOTE COUNTING FOR LOOSELY CONSISTENT,  
MULTI-ACTIVE REPLICATED SOFTWARE COMPONENTS 
 
 
AUTHOR:   




The use of replicated software components raises a variety of challenges.  To 
address such challenges, techniques are presented herein that support leaderless, multi-
version (even multi-vendor) software redundancy in order to provide fault tolerance and 
in-service software upgrade (ISSU) mechanisms by enabling a "just enough" agreement.  
Aspects of the presented techniques support redundant active replicas – without locks, peer 
messaging, or a designated leader – that may actively program the same downstream 
resources without conflicts even though they differ significantly in their methods of 
computation and order of outputs.  Additionally, the resulting system can tolerate both 
crashes and non-crash faults (such as wrong or omitted outputs) in a minority of replicas 
without an interruption of service.  Aspects of the presented techniques are applicable to 
complex replicated functions such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) best-path 
computations and/or the like. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Replicated software components have two chief uses: fault tolerance and 
component upgrade.  For fault tolerance, identical replicas are often seen as the ideal (as in 
the Replicated State Machines approach).  However, identical replicas can lead to the same 
deterministic faults across all replicas.  Moreover, identical replicas don't support 
component upgrades, where differences between versions can cause intentional variations 
in behavior.  "Design diversity" is the discipline of using multiple active replicas with 
intentionally different code bases. 
A key challenge in design diversity is correlation of the outputs of loosely 
consistent multi-active replicas.  While it is possible to simply have one designated leader 
and suppress the outputs of hot-spare replicas, this protects only against crash faults.  
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Instead, multiple replicas' outputs should be considered before the consensus is visible to 
downstream systems.  But how comparable are the outputs of different code bases?  What 
happens when they differ intentionally, as in bug fixes or new features?  
To address challenges of these types, techniques are presented herein that support 
a method for counting votes from non-identical replicas whose outputs should be allowed 
some degree of incidental or intentional variation.  Aspects of the method require no peer-
to-peer coordination, no resource locking, and no designated leader.  Additionally, aspects 
of the method allow replicas to join and leave, supporting scenarios such as, for example, 
ISSU.  Further, aspects of the method provide a generic mechanism with minimal domain-
specific semantics. 
As noted previously, replication is a common strategy for implementing fault-
tolerant systems.  Replicas may be identical or may be intentionally different, either for the 
added fault tolerance provided by design diversity or to support component upgrade.  
Replicas may be multi-active or there may be a single active replica doing work and others 
silently maintaining sufficient state to take over. 
A special advantage of multi-active replicas is the ability of a subsystem to compare 
their outputs in real time and use majority voting to choose the output that is passed to the 
rest of the system.  The challenge of multi-active replicas is how to compare the outputs of 
software components that may be intentionally different in their implementation details. 
Any solution must tolerate some incidental divergence that is not semantically relevant to 
downstream consumers, while at the same time must find sufficient correlators to recognize 
when two replicas are voting on "the same" output.  The best solution is the one that 
tolerates the greatest degree of incidental variation from the replicas, with the least amount 
of hand-coded, domain-specific comparator logic. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein provide a novel approach to comparing 
the outputs of multi-active, multi-version replicas.  A system is designed to tolerate 
extensive incidental variation without any hand-coded output comparator logic and it is 
easily extended to support additional variation using simple, declarative or hand-coded 
scalar comparators. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein are inspired by an idea from hardware 
design in which a device requires two volts to activate and there are three hardware replicas 
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that "vote" on activation by supplying one volt each.  The activation is maintained as long 
as any two replicas continue to supply the control voltage.  Unlike most distributed 
replication schemes where control messages are discrete "edge" events the replicas send 
and forget, this model requires replicas to maintain a "level" for the duration of the desired 
effect.  During periods when a quorum maintain the same published "level," that quorum 
output is visible to downstream processes. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein support a way of enhancing a relational 
database management system (RDBMS) to count votes as "level" statements by multi-
active replicas.  This enables a model where replicas publish their desired value for a given 
primary key of a table in the RDBMS, but where consumers of the RDBMS will not witness 
these rows unless there is a quorum of matching votes for the same value at that primary 
key.  Replicas are responsible for withdrawing their votes when they no longer wish the 
value published.  When the RDBMS sees the votes fall below a quorum, it deletes the row. 
Row updates are also supported.  
It is important to note that while aspects of the techniques presented herein concern 
consensus and databases, the techniques are not directly about achieving consensus for 
replicated databases.  That is a question of how to get the same inputs to replicas so they 
evolve state consistently.  The presented techniques deal with processing the outputs of 
replicas and uses voting and quorums to ensure a majority of replicas "vote" to produce the 
same output before downstream processes act on that output. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein are designed to tolerate incidental 
divergence in a number of dimensions while still requiring quorum on essential details.  
For example, the techniques may involve: 
 Limited scope of agreement.  Replicas must be able to declare the scope of 
agreement such that only outputs to shared scopes are subject to vote counting. 
Other outputs can freely differ.  This allows, for example, a new version of a 
replicated component to generate outputs that support some new software 
feature by publishing them to a new output table that the old version does not 
use. Only the new version's votes count on the new table. 
 Ordering.  Two replicas that construct an output with the same information 
arranged in a different order should be counted as voting for "the same" output. 
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 Temporal.  Replicas may run asynchronously and remotely.  Applying a strict 
interpretation of the "level" metaphor from hardware, replicas may be required 
to maintain the same level long enough to account for delivery delays and 
incidental variation in the timing of a replica's decision to publish.  It is better 
if the subsystem can detect asynchronous quorums and publish those results. 
But each replica's votes should count only monotonically – i.e., if vote i+k from 
one replica wins the election at a given primary key (PK), vote i from that same 
replica cannot count toward a future election. 
The core of the solution presented herein is a vote counting algorithm (discussed 
below) in the context of a system of active tables.  Each output table is under the exclusive 
control of a dedicated actor in a distributed message passing system.   This actor translates 
votes into rows in its output table; it is the single writer to this table.  Downstream processes 
see only the output table, not the individual votes.  Multi-active replicas use the client 
protocol to publish votes to these active tables.   
With reference to declared scope, as noted above, replicas dynamically declare the 
RDBMS tables where they intend to publish.  A replica that declares intent to publish is 
included in the quorum for all rows in that table.  Two replicas may agree on their votes to 
the tables they both declare but may make independent votes to tables they don't share. 
With reference to ordering aspects, as noted above, a database in at least first-normal form 
ensures every row contains only scalar data.  Aspects of the techniques presented herein 
counts votes separately for each primary key, so two votes are compared only on their 
scalar content.  With reference to temporal aspects, as noted above, each table may 
maintain sufficient prior votes from each replica and is able to construct monotonic 
quorums from these buffered votes. 
Consider an example algorithm and key data structures in which the actors in the 
following description are a single active table, T, and a set of replicated clients {C_1, ... 
C_n}. 
Table T maintains, among other things: 
 A set of "declared" clients currently expressing intent to publish to T.  Every 
client in this set is either "expected" or "pending." 
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 A set of "expected" clients – i.e., the subset of "declared" clients whose votes 
are required for consensus on any row. 
 A set of "pending" clients – i.e., the subset of "declared" clients who will 
become "expected" once they actually start voting. 
 The "output" table of winning outputs that is visible to downstream clients. 
 For each row in the output table, the set of clients whose votes agree with it. 
 A collection of pending votes indexed by primary key.  These are the client-
supplied rows with the same primary key for which there is not yet a quorum. 
 A bounded buffer (queue) of pending votes from each client. 
Each client C maintains, among other things: 
 All of its currently requested rows in a local table with the same primary key as 
T. 
 A sequence number, j, that increases monotonically and which is included as 
metadata on every row that it publishes (but not part of the primary key or 
payload of the actual row). 
A table-propagation subsystem may be provided in which replicas can publish their 
votes by saving them to a local table with the same primary key as T.  The replicas can 
maintain their vote "level" by leaving the vote in this table.  The table-propagation 
subsystem implements the client protocol, translating local inserts, updates, and deletes on 
this table into messages to T.  The client assigns monotonic sequence numbers to its 
messages to T.   
These messages may be 1:1 with the local table actions or may be batched in various 
ways.  The main design constraint on this subsystem is monotonicity: the client must not 
send an earlier value from its replica after a later value for the same key.  It is helpful if 
this subsystem uses reliable delivery for its messages to T. 
Members can be added and removed.  A challenge is that, if T learns about a new 
member before that member can vote, it might cause T to delete rows that are suddenly 
below quorum.  The algorithm employs a "pending voters" set to address this problem.  For 
example: 
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 When T learns a new member C has declared intent to publish, it adds C to the 
"pending" voters pool.  Its votes are allowed but not expected (as detailed on 
each operation). 
 When T sees any row from a pending voter, it promotes that voter to "expected" 
and adjusts the quorum to a majority of the new expected clients. Since this can 
only raise quorum, there is no need to recompute any elections. 
 When T learns C longer intends to publish: 
o If C is "pending" then it is simply deleted from the "pending" pool. 
o If C is "expected", T then: 
 Deletes C's votes from all data structures. 
 Re-computes the quorum based on the new "expected" pool. 
 Re-evaluates all elections using this new quorum. 
Insert and update operations can be performed such that T buffers votes that have 
not achieved quorum or that were earlier votes than a row that did achieve quorum.  Clients 
need not vote for the same rows in the same order.  For example: 
 Client C publishes a row with primary key K and sequence number j.  C 
maintains this row in its local table of expressed intent for the table T.  If C had 
a previous row in its local table with the same key, this row replaces it. 
 The table-propagation subsystem translates C's table change to a message it 
sends to T. 
 T receives this publication as a message. 
 If C is a pending member for the table, T promotes it to "expected.”  If C is 
neither expected nor pending, T ignores the message. 
 T checks whether the payload matches an existing output row at K. 
o If so, it adds C to the set of voters associated with the output row. 
o If not, it finds or creates an entry in the pending votes collection at K 
with a matching payload and adds <C, j> to the set of voters associated 
with that pending row.  If adding <C, j> to set of voters establishes a 
quorum, T moves the pending row to the output table, replacing any 
former output row at K.  For every <C_i, j> in the winning row, T 
removes all votes <C_i, j'> at K where j' < j.  This ensures no C_i will 
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ever vote to replace the current row with one of its own earlier (outdated) 
proposals. 
o If T buffers <C, j> as a pending vote and T's bounded buffer for C is 
already full, <C, j> will replace the oldest vote in that buffer and T will 
remove the old vote from the pending-votes collection. 
o If T promotes <C, j> to a winning row, it removes the vote from T's 
bounded buffer for C. 
It is important to note that this algorithm naturally chooses the "newest" matching 
row that it can.  That is, for example: 
 It is, by definition, the newest vote from C. 
 If there are newer pending votes from other clients that don't match, those do 
not have a quorum. 
 If there are older pending votes from other clients that do match, a quorum is 
present and the row is chosen and all older votes from all clients are deleted. 
This approach ensures monotonicity.  No client will ever vote to replace the current 
row with one of its own earlier votes.  This models the case in which one required voter is 
lagging behind other voters.  It also models the case in which the replicas really do not 
evolve the level in the same order, but eventually stabilize on a consensus level. 
Deletions may be handled utilizing different options.  A first option may be 
considered a pure “level” in which a quorum must maintain the row at the same time.  In 
the purest sense of level consensus, there must exist a time during which a quorum of voters 
agree on a row in order for that row to be adopted by T.  This leads to a simple 
implementation of deletion.  For example: 
 C deletes its row for key K in T. 
 The table propagation subsystem translates this into a message that is sent to T. 
 T receives this publication as a message. 
 If C is a pending member for the table, T promotes it to "expected."  If C is 
neither expected nor pending, T ignores the message. 
 If C is one of the voters for the output row at K, T removes C from the voters. 
If this results in a below-quorum status for the row, T deletes the row. Note that 
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there cannot exist a replacement row in pending votes with a quorum, because 
it would already have been promoted. 
 If C is one of the voters for one or more pending row, all its votes for K rows 
are simply deleted from all data structures. 
A second option for deletion may involve “delayed” deletes.  In asynchronous 
systems, temporal variance among replicas may make pure "level" quorums difficult to 
witness, especially if row data are changing quickly.  Consequently, a variant deletion 
algorithm may be employed that tolerates arbitrary temporal displacement with appropriate 
buffering.  For example: 
 C deletes its row for key K in T. 
 The table propagation subsystem translates this into a message that is sent to T. 
 T receives this publication as a message. 
 If C is a pending member for the table, T promotes it to "expected."  If C is 
neither expected nor pending, T ignores the message. 
 T finds its record of <C, j> (for all j) in all data structures and updates it to have 
a "deleted" status, but does not automatically remove it from any structure. 
 If <C, j> is one of the votes in the current output row at K and T detects that 
there is no longer a quorum of votes at K that are not "deleted", T deletes the 
row at K and deletes all the votes at that row from all data structures. 
 If <C, j> is a pending vote and there are a quorum of deleted votes for its 
pending payload, T deletes that payload and all its votes. 
 Insert/update is enhanced with the following behavior.  Vote counting ignores 
the "deleted" status of pending votes.  If already marked "deleted" they remain 
so marked when moved to the winning output row. 
The instant explication of aspects of the techniques presented herein will benefit 
from a discussion of various points of interest.  A first point of interest concerns the 
application of aspects of the techniques presented herein to continuously active control 
plane processes in a network packet router. For example, an application of the techniques 
presented herein may support redundant control-plane processes that are (a) multi-active 
for fast failover, (b) loosely coupled to reduce coordination overhead, and (c) non-
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deterministic to support independent upgrade and to avoid all processes failing in the same 
way on the same inputs. 
Any mechanism for reliably programming packet-forwarding hardware from 
redundant processors must overcome the challenge that it is unlikely and perhaps unwanted 
(for the sake of design diversity) that two control-plane replicas will issue the same 
programming commands in the same order. Simply interleaving commands from multiple 
replicas is likely to lead to unwanted intermediate states in the hardware.  The command 
sequences may interfere such that one replica's commands may "break" what the other is 
trying to "make," leading to a network outage. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein allow replicas to express a series of 
desired or stable states rather than a sequence of commands to achieve those states.  Actual 
programming of the hardware occurs only when a quorum of replicas agree on the desired 
end state.  The final translation from consensus stable state to a sequence of commands can 
be performed by a single process that can be restarted in the event of a fault. 
This capability may be used at steady state, but is also especially suited to ISSU 
with continuous service.  For example: 
 Version A is running at steady state, un-replicated. 
 Version B is started and begins processing inputs, but its votes are not yet 
required for programming hardware. 
 Version B is warmed up and the application programming interface (API) is 
programmed to begin counting its votes, requiring consensus on all hardware 
programming. 
 For some period, quorum requires votes from both Version A and Version B. 
 After a stable period, the API is programmed to stop requiring votes from 
Version A. 
 Version A is stopped – it has been replaced by Version B. 
 
A different variant for ISSU lets Version B run initially in a provisional state, 
comparing B’s votes to those of A without actually using B’s votes to compute output rows.  
This supports evaluation of the new version before allowing it to control downstream 
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systems.  Once deemed acceptable, the new version can transition to a state where its votes 
are counted and the ISSU proceeds as specified earlier. 
A second point of interest concerns buffer management and update frequency. The 
bounded buffer of pending votes provides support for temporal variance of inserts and 
updates up to an arbitrary frequency of updates, with larger buffers supporting more 
variance.  Aspects of the techniques presented herein do not specify any single means of 
selecting the size of these buffers.  Their size may be fixed or may be updated dynamically.  
A third point of interest concerns the fault tolerance of output tables.  Although one 
may assume that T is not replicated, its functionality is essentially fault tolerant because its 
content, as seen by its downstream consumers, is purely a function of the votes that are 
proposed by the clients.  T could be restarted and could learn the current level for each row 
from the data that is maintained in the clients.  
A fourth point of interest concerns the use of hashes.  The algorithm for vote 
counting is described as using row payloads as keys to lookup existing votes for the same 
payload.  Payloads are seldom efficient lookup keys, so the actual algorithm may employ 
payload hashes to improve such a lookup.  Hashes may be computed at each client in the 
table-propagation subsystem.  
A fifth point of interest concern coordination as needed. Aspects of the techniques 
presented herein do not assume replicas are free of all coordination.  An example where 
coordination may be needed concerns the generation of foreign keys for use in the output 
tables.  Two independent replicas cannot generate the same foreign keys without 
coordination, so they will likely need a fault-tolerant key-generation service to which they 
can submit natural keys and receive consistent foreign keys in return.  
A sixth point of interest concerns “Byzantine” fault tolerance.  For example, if votes 
are digitally signed, this solution tolerates Byzantine faults in a minority of replicas.  These 
are non-crash faults such as failure to vote or voting incorrectly (where "correctness" is 
whatever the majority decide).  Faulty processes cannot infect each other through the vote-
counting mechanism, since they communicate only with the API.  This limits the potential 
damage of a Byzantine fault and means simple majority voting is sufficient to handle the 
faults that can arise.  For example, Byzantine Agreement (by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease 
(1982)), by contrast, requires 3F+1 replicas to tolerate F faults because the processes are 
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attempting to achieve a consistent or internal state and must manage the spread among 
2F+1 non-faulty processes of misinformation from F faulty processes. 
A seventh point of interest concerns various extensions that may be possible.  One 
possible extension concerns flow control.  For example, rather than overwriting the oldest 
votes in its bounded buffers, T could exert back pressure on that client.  This would entail 
a protocol for T to send information to C.  The current protocol is unidirectional.  
Another possible extension concerns equality.  For example, literature on output 
selection includes numerous methods that go beyond the simple equality test described in 
the instant algorithm.  They are largely applicable to the instant model as well.  In fact, the 
instant model makes it easy to declare special comparisons per table, per column, or even 
per primary key.  Such extensions are not described in detail but one possible example 
would be to augment the declaration of each output table to specify per-column tolerance 
ranges such that two votes are "the same" if the comparison of their value in each column 
is within the declared maximum variance. 
In light of the discussion that was presented above, to further explicate aspects of 
the techniques that are presented herein consider the illustrative environment that is 
depicted in Figure 1, below. 
12
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Figure 1: Illustrative Environment 
 
Various of the key components of aspects of the techniques that are presented 
herein are depicted in Figure 1, above, with a light gray background.   
In brief, Figure 1, above, captures aspects of a flow in which N redundant clients, 
C0 and C1 in this case, provide “votes” by publishing key/value pairs to named tables (T0 
and T1 in this case).  These votes represent each client program’s desired state of the system 
in some way.  The level-based agreement system pushes these votes to the output-
processing system’s vote-counting subsystem.  This subsystem determines (a) which 
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clients are expected to vote on each table and (b) what the quorum value is for each key 
based on the expected voters and their current votes.    
Clients C0 & C1 must maintain their votes in their tables for as long as they want 
them to count toward quorum.  They can revoke or replace a vote when they see fit.  Over 
time they can also change the tables in which they choose to vote. 
The ultimate goal is to supply the Consensus Output Processor with a single value 
for each key in each table, based on consensus voting, so the program can act as if there 
was just a single process populating those tables even though the values actually come 
from redundant processor voting via consensus. 
It is important to note that while elements of the narrative that was presented above 
employed a database perspective, aspects of the techniques presented herein are applicable 
to a wide range of environments. 
For example, consider the case of a route processor (RP) programming an 
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) on a line card (LC).  Traditionally this is an 
edge-oriented protocol in which the RP uses a series of software development kit (SDK) 
calls to push the ASIC into a desired state.  In such a system, if loosely coupled redundant 
RP's wish to control the same LC's for fault tolerance, they would typically operate only in 
a primary/backup mode and any backup RP promoted to leader would never be sure of the 
state of the ASIC without performing some queries and/or resets.  In contrast, the solution 
presented herein allows an arbitrary degree of multi-active redundant RP's to provide 
greater fault tolerance. The idea is that any number of RP's that receive the same 
programming and route updates should reach convergence on effectively  the same desired 
forwarding policy for each controlled LC.  Thus, a mechanism is provided for allowing 
each RP to express not a sequence of update commands but a desired forwarding policy, 
atomically, to each LC, as a transaction-set of updates to a normalized data model hosted 
by each LC.  When a LC sees a consensus of votes on a new desired forwarding policy, it's 
the LC that generates the SDK commands to update the ASIC.  This provides an always-
on, leaderless form of redundancy that tolerates significant variation in the actual 
implementations of the RP's (as described above) including the possibility that different 
RP's may support different features. 
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The LC in this example plays the role of the database service (in a very lightweight 
and specialized form) that counts votes as described above.  This “database” is not, itself, 
fault tolerant because it is hosted by a non-redundant LC. 
Aspects of the techniques presented herein aim to change shape of the public SDKs 
that are exposed by different layers of a loosely coupled system.  For example, a vendor of 
forwarding hardware might choose to implement a level-based SDK for some 
programmable forwarding platform. This would be a way to support customer 
requirements to run routing software from multiple vendors as a cross-check and as a fault-
tolerance approach based on design diversity.  Seen the other way, a customer of 
forwarding platforms and routing software may adopt this approach and ask both kinds of 
vendor to supply compliant LC's and RP software, respectively, to conform to a standard 
level-based SDK.  
Various aspects of the techniques presented herein are of interest and note, 
including, for example: 
 A time-shifting "level-based" approach is a unique solution to the problem of 
correlating outputs over time. 
 The use of primary keys as voting correlators offers a unique solution to the 
problem of how to correlate output and normalized RDBMS schemas solve the 
ordering problem. 
 The use of declared intent to publish is a unique solution to the problem of 
identifying points where outputs should and should not be compared. 
 A bridging of the gap between models in which all vote reconciliation uses 
domain-specific logic (as in Recovery Blocks) and those where more generic 
but less robust means are suggested.  The exact structure of the RDBMS tables 
is domain specific, but the vote counting can be entirely generic. 
 Existing approaches do not employ the instant approach in, among other things, 
which domain-specific tabular structures are combined with domain-agnostic 
vote counting. 
In summary, techniques have been presented that support leaderless, multi-version 
(even multi-vendor) software redundancy to provide fault tolerance and ISSU by enabling 
a "just enough" agreement.  Aspects of the presented techniques support redundant active 
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replicas – without locks, peer messaging, or a designated leader – that may actively 
program the same downstream resources without conflicts even though they differ 
significantly in their methods of computation and order of outputs.  Additionally, the 
resulting system can tolerate both crashes and non-crash faults (such as wrong or omitted 
outputs) in a minority of replicas without interruption of service.  Aspects of the presented 
techniques are applicable to complex replicated function such as the BGP best-path 
computations and/or the like. 
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